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Abstract: This article compares and contrasts 
Dorion Cairn’s treatment of the relationship 
between phenomenology and psychology with 
Embree’s handling of that same topic. Embree, 
who to a great degree aligns with Schutz, and 
Cairns converge on the treatment of beha-
viorism. However, fundamental differences appear 
in their contrasting approaches to psychology, 
with Cairns seeking to uphold the distinctiveness 
of philosophy/phenomenology over against psy-
chology and Embree/Schutz inclining toward a 
more collaborative engagement with psychology. 
Their differences reflect their preference for trans-
cendental philosophy or phenomenological psy-
chology, both of which possible preferences were 
clearly recognized by Edmund Husserl in his 
“Nachwort zu meinen Ideen”. These preferences 
in turn have to do with the ultimate philosophical 
purposes each author is pursuing. 
 Resumen: Este artículo compara y contrasta el 
tratamiento de Dorion Cairn de la relación entre 
fenomenología y psicología con el manejo por 
parte de Embree del mismo tema. Embree —que 
en gran medida se alinea con Schutz— y Cairns 
convergen en el tratamiento del conductismo. 
Sin embargo, las diferencias fundamentales apa-
recen en sus enfoques que contrastan con la 
psicología, con Cairns tratando de mantener el 
carácter distintivo de la filosofía / fenomenología 
frente a la psicología y con Embree/Schutz incl-
inándose hacia un compromiso más colaborativo 
con la psicología. Sus diferencias reflejan sus 
preferencias por la filosofía trascendental o por la 
psicología fenomenológica —ambas preferencias 
posibles fueron claramente reconocidas por 
Edmund Husserl en su "Nachwort zu meinen 
Ideen". Estas preferencias a su vez tienen que 
ver con los propósitos filosóficos finales que 
persigue cada autor. 
Keywords: Transcendental phenomenology. Pheno-
menological psychology. Theory of science. 
Methodology. Cultural sciences. Behaviorism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Lester Embree produced two significant monographs: The 
Schutzian Theory of the Cultural Sciences (Dordrecht, Springer, 2015) and 
Reflective Analysis: A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigation 
(Morelia, Editorial jitanjáfora, 2003). These books reflect two fundamental 
philosophical interests of Embree: theory of science (or Wissenschaftslehre) and 
the basic doing of phenomenology, as opposed to studying the texts of 
phenomenological authors (Embree 2003, 10). At the same time, Embree, along 
with Richard Zaner and Fred Kersten, had been publishing articles found in the 
Dorion Cairns Archives, and coming out, in particular, with a monograph, Cairns’s 
dissertation, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013), and 
a collection of essays by Embree entitled Animism, Adumbration, Willing, and 
Wisdom: Studies in the Phenomenology of Dorion Cairns (Bucharest, Zetabooks, 
2012). Embree repeatedly praised Cairns as his teacher, to whom he dedicated 
Reflective Analysis. Indeed, several of the themes Embree addresses in Reflective 
Analysis reflect subjects that Cairns addressed in depth, such as the need to 
engage in the doing of phenomenology rather than scholarship on it; the 
emphasis on knowing, valuing, and willing; the focus on “intentiveness” for which 
he credit Cairns; the recognition of the importance of culture and secondary 
passivity; the repeated discussion of feigning; the highlighting of perceptual 
“appearances”; and the distinguishing between direct and indirect experiencing 
(Embree 2003, 10, 20, 40, 112, 120, 136, 140, 188, 200, 314, 328, 354-356, 
384, 390, 428, 452, 458, 502, 528). Reflective Analysis shows the influence of 
Cairns on Embree, and it is no wonder that Embree dedicated the book to him. 
But what of the theory of science, Embree’s other predominate interest? At first, 
one might think, as I did, that it was basically Schutz’s influence that lies at the 
root of this concern of Embree’s and that Cairns’s work has nothing to do with 
the theory of science, but the fact is that Cairns was quite interested in the 
relationship between phenomenology and psychology, and, in fact, for the first 
half of his career at Hunter College in New York and Rockford College in Illinois, 
he taught psychology (Cairns 2002b, 69).  
This article will compare and contrast Cairn’s treatment of the relationship 
between phenomenology and psychology with Embree’s handling of that same 
topic. What will become apparent is that although Embree, who to a great degree 
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aligns with Schutz, and Cairns converge on the treatment of behaviorism, 
fundamental differences appear in their approach to psychology, with Cairns 
seeking to uphold the distinctiveness of philosophy/phenomenology over against 
psychology and Embree/Schutz inclining toward a more collaborative engage-
ment with psychology. Their differences reflect their preference for transcen-
dental philosophy or phenomenological psychology, both of which possible 
preferences were clearly recognized by Edmund Husserl in his “Nachwort zu 
meinen Ideen”.  
2. CAIRNS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
In 1934, Cairns was lecturing at the New School on Husserlian phenome-
nology, and he took issue with Dr. Andrew D. Osborn’s interpretation of Husserl’s 
thought, as is indicated in what appears in Cairns’s papers to be the beginnings 
of a review of Osborn’s 1934 The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl in its 
Development from his Mathematical Interests to his First Concept of Phenome-
nology in Logical Investigations. In that fragment, Cairns insists that Husserl’s 
Ideen introduced a development beyond Logical Investigations in contrast to 
Osborn’s belief that the later work merely restates the earlier one1 
Cairns (2002a, 45) understood the Logical Investigations to involve the 
adoption of an attitude of suspended judgement toward things given in expe-
rience (to avoid taking over unreflectively prejudices about such things) and an 
attempt to describe the structure of awareness of objects and its typical ways of 
meaning objects (such as in the “present” or “future” or as “physical” or 
“cultural”). At this early stage of Husserl’s work, the term “phenomenology” 
referred merely to the careful descriptions of things, that is, what appeared in 
experience exactly as they appeared (Cairns 2007, 117). However, in Cairns’s 
view, Husserl’s account of the structure of awareness to which objects were 
 
1 “Dr. Osborn’s monograph presents for the first time in English an abstract of Husserl’s Logische 
Untersuchungen. He has strictly limited his theme to the development of Husserl’s thought up to the 
publication of the first edition of that work and accordingly it may be of interest to consider what the 
position of that work is in the light of his later work. This is particularly desirable because Dr. Osborn is in 
error when he states that the Ideen ‘is in essence a restatement of the main points of Logical 
Investigations’ and that ‘the understanding of it is greatly helped by approaching it through the earlier 
work.’ Indeed, it is not too much to state that to approach the later works armed with concepts gathered 
from the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen is to render an understanding of phenomenology 
more difficult than it would be if one came empty-handed”. Cairns 2002a, 43. 
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given, for all its rigor, seemed to be nothing more than a kind of introspective 
psychology. Consequently, the Investigations seemed to depend upon results 
arrived at through psychological research. This reliance, however, was proble-
matic since the Investigations argued that logic should not be based on psycho-
logy, under pains of falling into psychologism. Paradoxically, Husserl’s non-
psychologistic logic rested on an informally articulated introspective psycho-logy 
(Cairns 2002a, 47).  
In fact, Husserl specifically described the first edition of Logische Unter-
suchungen as a “descriptive psychology”–a statement he retracted two years 
later. Despite that retraction, the way he presented the first edition was 
thoroughly consistent with his earlier work, such as the Philosophie der 
Arithmetik, which he subtitled “Logical and Psychological Investigations”. The fact 
that he always regarded the investigations of the Arithmetik as “phenome-
nological” (even though he subtitled them as “psychological”) indicates that he 
did not draw clearly the distinction between phenomenology and psychology that 
he was only able to make definitively in the 1920s (Cairns 2007, 118). 
An additional problem for the early Husserl in Cairn’s opinion was that within 
a purely descriptive psychology there are various presuppositions on which one 
relies and about which one has not yet become sufficiently critical. For instance 
(Cairns 2002a, 47), psychological descriptions of awareness have as their themes 
a mind believed without sufficient examination to exist in world time. Such a 
mind would also be the mind of a psycho-physical object, a mind connected with 
a body, and, consequently, such a mind is taken as developing in the natural 
world from birth, as a process in world time. In his letter to John Wilde, Cairns 
(1975, 160) shows how Husserl himself in his later works (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic and “Nachwort zu meinem Ideen”) criticized his early work 
similarly, for not being sufficiently critical of suppositions. In the later works, 
Husserl acknowledges that the judgments produced by a “pure psychology” 
might focus only on inner processes and seek to establish their essential 
characteristics. However such judgments would still involve a co-positing of the 
relationship of such psychic processes to the organism and therefore to some-
thing worldly, even though this co-positing might not enter expressly into the 
conceptual content of the judging. Such a co-positing would still have its 
determining effect on those judgments unless this co-positing is consciously 
bracketed. Furthermore, Cairns (ib. 162) notes how the later Husserl described 
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his earlier Philosophy as Rigorous Science as a descriptive psychology focusing 
on inner processes and excluding (via “pure psychological reduction”) any 
relationship with physical processes, that is, as a natural fact. However, the later 
Husserl recognized that such a psychology would nevertheless still consider 
psychic processes as worldly beings; such descriptive psychology only refrains 
from conceptually relating this worldliness to physical nature (ib. 163f). Thus, 
even a pure psychology deploying an eidetic methodology aimed at delineating 
essential features does not prescind from the supposition of the worldliness of 
the objects whose essences it seeks to determine, and, insofar as a pure eidetic 
psychology is conducted within the natural attitude it remains a dogmatic, 
positive science despite its a priori nature (ib. 165).  
According to Cairns (ib. 161), following Husserl, the question comes down to 
what one wants for philosophy, especially since ideally, it ought not itself be a 
positive science and it ought not base itself on such positive sciences as 
psychology or anthropology. Husserl argued that to base one’s philosophy on a 
positive science of man or the human psyche is to succumb to a form of 
psychologism, “corrupts the pure meaning of philosophy”. Cairns (ib. 161) cites 
Husserl in a passage from “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen” that reiterates the danger 
to philosophy if it is based on psychology: 
The misdirectedness remains unaltered even when a pure inner psychology is 
developed as an a priori science. Even then, pure inner psychology remains a 
“positive” science and can be the basis for “positive” or “dogmatic” science–but never 
for philosophy. (Cairns’s translation of Husserl 1952, 148) 
There are two ways in which psychologism “corrupts” philosophy. Husserl 
(2001, 1, 77-83, 90-99, 119-122, 129-133), in the “Prolegomena” to the Logical 
Investigation, illuminated psychologism’s basic flaw. The psychologistic explan-
ation of the a priori rules of logic (e.g., the principle of contradiction) as merely 
the causal products of a particular empirical, material context in the end 
relativizes those rules to that context, as if other material, causal processes might 
have yielded an alternative set of logical rules, in which, for example, the 
principle of contradiction would no longer hold. Psychology and the very structure 
of explanation itself, however, both cannot dispense with the principle of 
contradiction insofar as both depend upon claims whose terms must mean one 
thing and not another if those claims are to have any clear meaning at all and 
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insofar as those claims present themselves as true and not false. Moreover, if the 
account of the mental acts in relation to which objects (real or ideal) were given 
would itself depend ultimately on explanations given by psychological science, 
those claims would be vulnerable to being undermined should the psychology 
upon which they depend be disproven. In addition, if mental acts are construed 
as the products of particular, context-limited empirical, material processes–as 
psychological science would do–then could not the mental acts of philosophy 
itself, e.g. the knowing and describing of other mental acts such as “perception”, 
“memory”, and others be themselves also relativized to their causal context in 
such a way that this knowing and describing could make no claim to the 
universality to which philosophy has aspired? To base philosophical claims on the 
findings of contemporary psychological or anthropological science risks relativi-
zing those claims themselves to the current state of that science or to the 
material causal forces on which empirical science focuses.  
But for Cairns and for Husserl, another problem with psychologism has to do 
with how it falls short of the conscientiousness requisite for philosophy, thereby 
“corrupting” philosophy, to use Cairns’s translation of Husserl. While the “Prole-
gomena” denies the psychological explanation of the rules of logic, the “objects” 
correlative to psychological acts, Husserl’s descriptive psychological account of 
those acts, while “reflective”, nevertheless tends simply to take over common 
sense or even theoretical psychological findings of those acts without rigorous 
philosophical examination, without submitting to scrutiny their unexam-ined 
worldly presuppositions. As such, this descriptive psychological account does not 
meet the standard for philosophy that Husserl articulates in his Cartesian 
Meditations, the text of Husserl that Cairns (2002a, 48) considered to be the 
most clear and comprehensive account of the purpose and method of 
transcendental awareness. For Cairns, the Cartesian Meditations clarified what 
he took to be the more primitive analyses of Ideen, which had at least introduced 
the idea of the phenomenological reduction and the opening of the transcendental 
sphere. Philosophy for Husserl involves striving for complete freedom from 
prejudices, “shaping itself with actual autonomy according to ultimate evidences 
it has itself produced” (Husserl 1960, 6) arriving at a knowledge for which the 
philosopher “can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his 
absolute insight” (ib. 2). Hence, one could take over any description of mental 
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acts developed by a descriptive psychology only if one has “seen for oneself” that 
those descriptions validly, or fulfillingly, presented such mental acts. 
Cairns (2004, 26) articulated a similar vision of philosophical rigor: 
The fundamental methodological principle of Husserlian phenomenology may, I think, 
be initially formulated as follows: No opinion is to be accepted as philosophical 
knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by observation of what is 
seen as itself given “in person”. Any belief seen to be incompatible with what is seen 
to be itself given is to be rejected. (italics are Cairns’s) 
Such a view of philosophy requires a critical stance toward the worldly 
presuppositions that Cairns thought that the psychologistic positions of Philo-
sophy as Rigorous Science had not subjected to sufficient scrutiny. Consequently, 
the attitude of neutrality or self-restraint that characterizes the transcendental 
reduction that the Husserlian phenomenologist takes up   
[…] means not only that he makes explicit and seizes upon the believedness of the 
continuously, even if “only tacitly”, automatically, believed in intentionally objective 
world as a whole, but also that he actively dissociates himself from this fundamental 
and continuously validated belief. Thus the world and all intra-worldly things, in the 
broadest sense, are regarded purely as “what is believed-in”, “what is meant”, etc. 
This fixed policy of dissociation from all believing, valuing, and willing —automatic as 
well as actional— is then maintained in his reflective seizing upon mental processes. 
(ib. 35, his italics) 
One’s mental life itself now becomes a process in the world correlative to 
one’s transcendental life, which presupposes neither the existence nor the 
possibility of the world, as other all other philosophical inquiries do, at least tacitly 
(ib. 35f).  
One can see finally why Cairns opposed Osborn’s view that Logical Inves-
tigations was Husserl’s fundamental work whose findings subsequent works only 
restated. While Husserl recognized in the Investigations that the norms of logic 
could not be psychologically explained, he nevertheless relied on a descriptive 
psychology that would have rendered philosophy itself as dependent upon a 
positive science and would have fallen short of the standards of philosophy that 
require that one not accept any descriptions that one has not rigorously examined 
and seen for oneself as true. The introduction of the phenomenological reduction 
in Ideas 1 made it imperative that descriptions of acts and their correlative 
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objects need to be scrutinized from within the framework the reduction opens, 
namely the sphere of transcendental philosophy. While Cairns recognizes that 
the Ideas and Philosophy as Rigorous Science initiated this transition to the 
transcendental sphere, he saw the later works of Cartesian Meditations and 
Formal and Transcendental Logic as achieving a kind of culmination of the 
transition begun in those earlier works. Paradoxically, these later works bring to 
conclusion the critique of psychologism that had begun in the “Prolegomena” to 
the Logical Investigations but that had not been adequately executed in that 
Husserl relied on an insufficiently examined descriptive psychology in that earlier 
work. It is clear, too, why Cairns asserted that not only do the later works not 
merely restate the results of the Investigations but it is also the case that one 
cannot really understand the achievement and the limitations of the 
Investigations unless one views them from the perspective of Husserl’s later 
works. 
In a sense, Cairns’s engagement with psychology results in a kind of 
Wissenschaftslehre in which psychology takes it legitimate place within the 
overaching framework provided by transcendental philosophy–and this point of 
view might find its correlate in the mapping of the regional ontologies developed 
by the self-explication of the transcendental ego and spelling out the objectivities 
that the sciences presuppose (Husserl 1960, 62-64, 136-139, 152-157). The 
main concern of Cairns and Husserl in establishing this framework for the 
sciences is principally to preserve the integrity of philosophy itself, to prevent its 
corruption, its reliance on weak bases, and its laxity about its own responsibility 
to endorse only conclusions that it has tested. One might say that its main 
concern is a bit defensive, resisting the incursion of psychology upon its own turf.  
Of course, Cairns and Husserl also recognize the benefits that situating psy-
chology with reference to a prior transcendental phenomenology can bring. For 
instance, Cairns (2010, 7f, 26f) argues that Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology enables one to recognize that physical reality and psychic reality 
are mutually heterogenous, thereby undermining the mistaken suppositions on 
which physicalistic and behaviorist psychologies rest. In addition, Husserl (1970, 
298f) himself was clear that the transcendental phenomenology that subjects to 
critique the unexamined prejudices of the psychological sciences, such as those 
that result in physicalism and behaviorism, actually bring to realization the very 
rational ideals of conformity to evidence that have given birth to the enterprise 
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of science itself. Transcendental phenomenology aids psychological science, 
which might be prone to overlook how mental acts are given and to reduce them 
to mere physical, causally determined processes, in realizing that unprejudiced 
and evidence-based enterprise that lies at the roots of psychology’s own aspi-
rations. Finally, transcendental phenomenology preserves a space within which 
its claims to truth must be taken on their own terms and not undermined because 
they are simply the products of material causal processes. By so doing, transcen-
dental phenomenology opens up the possibility that the claims of psychological 
science itself can find a place within this same space and not be undermined by 
a self-referential argument. Such an argument, for instance, might assert that 
scientific acts of knowing are nothing more than the causal products of material 
processes just like the non-scientific psychological acts that psychological science 
investigates. As such, it could be argued that scientific acts themselves are 
relativized to their empirical, material context and are mere responses to physical 
determinants operating behind the back of psychologists and beneath the 
threshold of their consciousness. This would be the case, however much those 
psychologists might pretend that their statements lay claim to an intellectual 
validity that all other scientists ought to find convincing, regardless of whatever 
physical processes might be acting on those other scientists. 
While transcendental phenomenology can afford these benefits to psycho-
logy, they are secondary to the fundamental emphasis characterizing Husserl’s 
and Cairns’s philosophical project of demarcating the relations of the sciences to 
philosophy, namely to ensure that the integrity of philosophy be maintained by 
not depending on a science outside itself or incorporating within its framework 
scientific findings that have not been endorsed by the careful appropriation by 
which philosophy preserves its distinctiveness, autonomy, and eminence.  
3. SCHUTZ / EMBREE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
Embree (2015, vii) admits from the start that his book Schutzian Theory of 
the Cultural Sciences is aimed at expounding and advancing Schutz’s views on 
the theory of the cultural sciences, and he contends that the task of a 
Wissenschaftslehre was fundamental for Schutz as well as Husserl. Embree 
believes that both of the approached the sciences positively, in contrast to other 
currents in the phenomenological tradition that approached the sciences more 
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defensively. Embree (ib. 5f) differentiates from the beginning the science-
founding discipline of the positivists (physics), of Husserl (transcendental pheno-
menology), and of Schutz (a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, 
or, in other words, a phenomenological psychology).  
Following Schutz and providing a framework in which one might situate the 
science of psychology, Embree (ib. 51, 81) maps out four levels of a hierarchy of 
thinking that make up a “theory of science”, whose fourth level is “philosophical”. 
On the bottom level is everyday, prescientific life in which actors, partners, and 
observers interpret objects, situations, or the meanings of each other. Above that 
is the level of “substantive cultural science”2 in which scientists develop empirical 
or theoretical accounts of common-sense interpretations. On the third level 
“scientific science theorists” reflect on their work in level two, to examine 
foundations and improve research and to seek to determine a disciplinary 
definition, basic concepts, and the methodological procedures of the particular 
science in which they are involved. Philosophical science theory takes place on 
the fourth level, and philosophical theorists reflect on the three previous levels 
and their interrelationships. This final level is widest in scope, but farthest away 
from the concrete data. Embree asserts that what is distinctive about the fourth, 
philosophical level is that it takes account of more than one discipline and the 
work of diverse cultural scientists.  
On the bases of this hierarchy of levels, Embree (ib. 106) speculates on 
possible relationships between philosophers and cultural scientists. Both can 
meet in the area of methodology on the third level. However, cultural scientists 
need not understand their own approach philosophically, and an effective cultural 
scientist need not even have a sophisticated understanding of her methodology. 
Moreover, a scientific or philosophical understanding of methodology may not be 
needed for the executing of one’s science, and, in fact, too much reflection on 
methodology can interfere with the pursuit of that science itself. As examples of 
cultural scientists who do engage in methodological considerations, Embree 
points to Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, and it is possible for cultural scientists 
to become philosophers, as occurred with Schutz. Finally, it is conceivable that 
 
2 Embree (2015, vii, 17) uses the term “cultural sciences” rather than the term “social sciences”, 
because it includes ethology and recognizes that “culture” is also to be found among non-humans, chim-
panzees, for instance, and because Schutz’s investigations included history, which is not traditionally con-
joined with the social sciences. 
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philosophers themselves might engage in cultural scientific science to some 
degree.   
Schutz, who described himself as a “sociologically informed philosopher”, 
conceived his own phenomenological psychology in the tradition of Husserl as 
being foundational for all the other cultural sciences, and thus clearly operating 
on the fourth of the hierarchic level in a theory of science (ib. 49, 51-53). In 
addition, from that fourth level, Schutz took account of the methodological 
reflections that Max Weber and Georg Simmel had already developed for the 
cultural sciences and that could be located on level three of the science theory, 
and Schutz attempted to provide more substantial foundations (ib. 51). Insofar 
as Schutz sought foundations for all the cultural sciences, he was working on a 
universal, philosophical plane. Of course insofar as Embree describes Weber as 
working on a foundation for the culture sciences–that is, more than one3–there 
is a sense in which he too worked on the philosophical level, though Weber was 
impatient with deep-level methodological investigations and often broke them off 
when he had gone as far as he thought it necessary to go (Schutz 1967, 7). As 
a result, Schutz (Embree 2015, 52) elucidated many concepts that were nebulous 
in Weber’s work, such as “meaningful action”, “subjective meaning”, “moti-
vation”, “intersubjective understanding”, etc.  
Given that the philosophical level encompasses the three preceding levels, 
Embree (ib. 54) is correct in explaining what the basic concepts, distinctive 
methods, and disciplinary definition would be of Schutz’s own phenomenological 
psychology, which forms the foundation of all the cultural sciences. 
Consequently, Embree lists several of Schutz’s basic concepts, such as “eidos”, 
“empathy”, “ego”, “inner time”, “pre-predicative experience”, “intentionality”, 
etc. The distinctive methods of Schutz’s phenomenological psychology consist in 
reflection on intentional experiences and their objects; intentional, genetic, and 
constitutive analyses; an epoché; and eidetic description. Finally, the disciplinary 
definition of Schutzian phenomenological psychology indicates that it is not a 
formal science, but is content-focused, and it concentrates on the meaningfulness 
of objects, actions, others, precisely the kind of meaningfulness that natural 
scientific approaches (including behavioristic psychology) abstract from (ib. 55). 
 
3 Embree (2015, 79) does mention that Parsons and Weber were concerned only with sociology, and 
as such their reflection on their own science would have exemplified scientific science theory rather than 
philosophical science theory. 
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While social psychology makes use of methodological individualism as a means 
for studying group life, Schutz admits that his phenomenological psychology 
engages in an artificial abstraction of the individual from society in order to be 
able to present how meanings and others are constituted (ib. 55f). I would add 
that Schutz’s phenomenological psychology is also eidetic in nature and differs in 
this way from social psychology that would be focused on empirical cases. 
Embree (ib. 56) concludes his explanation of Schutz’s phenomenological psycho-
logy by noting that the question of whether it needs to be grounded in and 
radicalized by transcendental phenomenology “need not be pursued in the pre-
sent study”4. 
In The Schutzian Theory of the Social Sciences, with this notion of an 
ultimate, founding philosophy, that is, of a phenomenological psychology, and 
the four layers of science theory, Embree goes on to treat various cultural 
sciences and situate them within the framework he establishes. In the first place, 
Embree (ib. 50) points out that Schutz does not assign the science of psychology 
itself any place within his classifications, though he does refer to psychoanalysis, 
behaviorism, and Gestalt theory, and hence his phenomenological psychology, 
which provides the foundation for the all the cultural sciences represents at the 
same time his most substantial discussion of psychology, which Embree enhances 
by discussing its basic concepts, distinctive methods, and disciplinary definition. 
Embree (ib. 19) shows how economics, like all cultural sciences, must comply 
with the postulate of subjective interpretation, that is, it must attend to the 
“subjective” meaning of an (economic) action by an actor, that is, to what the 
actor means by her action. As result, Schutz’s phenomenological psychology, 
along with ideal-type methodology5 correlative to it, makes available the 
conceptual machinery to explain such subjective meaning in economics. Further, 
the marginal-utility principle defines the discipline of modern economics within 
the cultural sciences (ib. 22f). Similarly, jurisprudence (ib. 31) depends on a 
basic norm that defines the domain of legal action and that situates the subjective 
meaning context of any legal actor. This disciplinary definition, whose basic 
 
4 Embree (2015, 53) acknowledges that transcendental phenomenology has opened up questions 
useful for the cultural sciences and, with phenomenological psychology, has answered many of them, but 
Schutz did not find it necessary to work on the transcendental level other than in his clarification of the 
structures of consciousness in the Phenomenology of the Social World, part 2. 
5 For instance, Weber’s construction of the Protestant in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism is based on an ideal type of the Protestant in which Weber attempts to construct the motives and 
purposes, that is, the meaning of economic actions of the Protestant as economic actors. 
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concepts can draw on the concepts of subjective meaning that Schutz’s 
phenomenological psychological affords, also ends up resorting to the methods 
of ideal type construction (explaining the motives of legal actors) and insi-
der/outsider (or subjective/objective meaning) in order to explain interactions 
within a legal framework. Embree (ib. 69f) demonstrates how cultural anthro-
pology, which addresses the collective cultural patterns of primitive group life, 
would not constitute a psychological science whose focus would be on individual 
lives, though its basic concepts would have to draw on the foundational concepts 
Schutz develops about intersubjective meaning interpretation in his phenomeno-
logical psychology. Finally, Embree (ib. 42) examines sociology, which for Schutz 
would have been defined as a discipline in terms of investigating contemporaries 
and of beginning with social groups to which individuals belong or with individuals 
relating to others in such groups. While Schutz tended to assimilate sociology 
with the social psychology (ib. 38, 42-45), which his own cultural scientific essays 
“The Stranger” and “The Homecomer” instantiate in an exemplary manner, he 
did recognize that in the United States sociology and social psychology could be 
separated. However, insofar as sociology would presuppose intersubjective 
meaning interpretation, Schutz’s own foundational phenomeno-logical psycho-
logy, which he later described as a social psychology, offered the (eidetic) basic 
concepts that any sociology could deploy and that he masterfully employed in his 
own cultural scientific works on the stranger and the homecomer (ib. 42-45).  
This quick recapitulation of Embree’s Wissenschaftslehre makes it apparent 
that when it comes to disciplinary definition, one of the tasks engaged in at level 
three of the science theory hierarchy, such as the definition of the field of 
economics as marked out by the marginal utility theory or jurisprudence in terms 
of a basic legal norm–as Hans Kelsen suggested (ib. 27)–, self-reflective 
practitioners of those sciences and philosophers could collaborate together and 
converge in their findings. As regards the methodology that science theorists may 
try to elucidate, one could imagine diverse methodologies (e.g. statistics) on 
which their sciences might rely, but Embree with Schutz repeatedly suggests that 
all the cultural sciences, if they are going to take account of the subjective 
meaning of actors, must always be able to resort to ideal-type construction as a 
basic methodology. Indeed, Schutz (1964, 84f) himself insists that all generali-
zations and idealizations in the social sciences must be able to be traced back to 
the subjective meanings of individual actors, able to be captured in ideal types, 
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since such actors interpret their world in the way that the objects of the natural 
sciences, such as electrons or molecules do not. This necessity of the cultural 
sciences to be able to revert to type construction reflects the deeper reality that 
actors interpret their relationship to the world and each other and that this deeper 
reality is what Schutz’s phenomenological psychology expounds in its fullness. 
Consequently, it is no wonder that when Embree takes up the third component 
of layer three of science theory reflection, basic concepts, he recommends all the 
categories relevant for the interpretation of subjective meaning in the social 
world spelled out in Schutz’s phenomenological psychology. While science theo-
rists within a specific science and in collaboration with philosophers are able to 
articulate the definitions of their distinctive disciplines, the identification of the 
importance of ideal-typical methodology for all the cultural sciences and the 
relevance of Schutzian phenomenological psychology for the basic concepts of all 
the cultural sciences indicates the foundational, philosophical nature of Schutz’s 
science theory, which crosses the boundaries of all the cultural sciences.  
Given that Embree envisions Schutz’s phenomenological psychology as 
furnishing basic concepts to all the cultural sciences, which all engage in the 
subjective interpretation of meaning for which the ideal-type methodology is 
most apt, one can understand why Embree repeatedly insists that Schutz not be 
classified as phenomenological sociologist. Embree (2015, 78, 159) explain that 
few of Schutz’s works are sociological and even those few are more social-
psychological in nature (ib. 78, 159). In addition, Embree suggests that Schutz 
strives to articulate a theory that reaches beyond sociology insofar as he 
identifies himself as a “sociologically sophisticated philosopher” rather than a 
philosophically sophisticated sociologist (ib. 78) and insofar as Schutz’s interests 
extend to other sciences besides sociology to the point that his account of 
economics is more thorough than his account of sociology (ib. 90). A further 
danger of identifying Schutz’s work with phenomenological sociology is that it 
might discourage psychology, psychotherapy, and similar sciences from mining 
the resources of Schutz’s theory for their own sciences. This is especially so if 
Schutz is mistakenly taken to be basically concerned with social groups instead 
of interpretive relations between individuals that eventually result in collectivities 
(ib. 94s). Immediately after this comment, Embree proceeds to list the basic 
concepts that psychotherapy would use and then to itemize Schutzian basic 
concepts about intersubjective meaning interpretation that would also be of value 
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for psychotherapy as a science. Clearly, the point seems to be to refuse to identify 
Schutz’s work with sociology in order to make its resources available to the broad 
spectrum of the cultural sciences. It should be added, however, that at one point 
Embree (ib. 42) admits that Schutz characterized his own phenomenological 
psychology as a “social psychology” and that he considered sociology as not being 
distinguished from social psychology in much the same way that sociologists 
today view social psychology as a part of sociology. Given these complex 
relationships, it is understandable why many might consider Schutz a social 
psychologist.   
4. CAIRNS / HUSSERL VERSUS EMBREE / SCHUTZ ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Although both Cairns/Husserl and Embree/Schutz are deeply interested in a 
Wissenschaftslehre that articulates the relationship between phenomenology and 
psychology, their emphases are quite different. First of all, the principal concern 
of Cairns and Husserl as he reads him is for philosophy itself, what one’s hopes 
are for philosophy. Given that phenomenology as philosophy and psychology 
were blended in Husserl’s early writings, particularly in the Logical Investigations 
in which a non-psychologistic logic was presented as relying on an introspective 
descriptive psychology, both Cairns and Husserl initiated a reform that began in 
Ideas 1 and culminated in Formal and Transcendental Logic and Cartesian 
Meditations, as Cairns tells the story. The point was to establish the autonomy of 
phenomenology as a philosophy over against psychology. This autonomy was to 
be achieved in three ways. First of all, there was a need to separate psychology 
from phenomenology. It was not enough to establish the independence of the 
objects of cognition, such as the rules of logic, from the underlying material 
conditions that might relativize them, but also the acts through which such 
objects were known needed to be known independently of the material conditions 
through which a descriptive psychology might explain those acts. Even efforts to 
engage in a pure psychology focused on inner processes eidetically analyzed 
(e.g., in Philosophy as Rigorous Science) would nevertheless fail to escape 
unexamined presuppositions about worldliness on which such a psychology would 
rely. It was of importance then to separate phenomenology as philosophy from 
psychology, as the phenomenological reduction did, establishing on the basis of 
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the reduction a transcendental phenomenological sphere over against psychology 
conducted within the natural attitude. The separation, the first step toward esta-
blishing phenomenological, philosophical autonomy further enhances the autono-
my of philosophy in two ways. It eliminates the danger of philosophy and pheno-
menology being undermined because reliant on and relativized to the current 
state of psychological science, which, were it to be altered, would undo the 
philosophy based upon it. In addition, this separation between phenomenology 
and psychology ensure that striving for philosophical responsibility, that refusal 
to take over without critical examination, any of the claims of psychology, in 
particular about psychic acts, unless the philosopher can see for herself that such 
claims are supported by the evidential having of what is claimed. 
By contrast, the Embree/Schutz paradigm shows little interest in upholding 
the autonomy of philosophy or phenomenology that is to be separated from 
psychology and stand over against it. In the first place, Embree, following Schutz, 
seems quite content with having a distinctive phenomenological psychology, or 
a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, as itself the philosophical 
foundation for the cultural sciences. As Embree observes, Schutz provides no 
other place for a separate science of psychology in his Wissenschaftslehre, 
although were he to determine a niche for psychology, it would no doubt be a 
kind of cultural science like psychotherapy and would probably rely on the basic 
concepts and methodology of ideal type construction that Schutz sees as 
foundational for all the cultural science. 
Instead of protecting the autonomy of philosophy/phenomenology over 
against the cultural sciences (among which we might locate the contemporary 
science of psychology), Embree and Schutz conceive of a much more cooperative 
relationship. In the first place, Embree (2015, 79) denominates his own science 
theory as a theory of cultural science rather than philosophy of cultural science 
because Schutz recognizes that social scientists also are accustomed to reflect in 
illuminating way on the basic concepts and methodologies of their particular 
science. Despite this convergence between self-reflective cultural scientists and 
philosophy, Embree (ib.) also allows for an implicit distinction between scientific 
and philosophical science theory insofar as he does distinguish these two types 
of science theory by situating them on the separate third and fourth rungs of the 
hierarchy of science theory and insofar as he admits that philosophical science 
theory seeks to spell out foundational basic concepts and methodologies for 
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several sciences (e.g. the cultural sciences) as opposed to scientific science 
theories that limit themselves to their own disciplines. However, the convergence 
between philosophy and the cultural sciences can be further seen since Embree 
argues that on level three of the hierarchy scientific science theorists of the 
cultural sciences have defined their disciplines in a way that philosophers can find 
to be effective and acceptable. For instance, economists claim that the principle 
of marginal utility specifies their area of investigation, or Hans Kelsen presents 
the basic norm of law as marking out the field of jurisprudence. Philosophers can 
also build on, develop, or even correct the basic concepts and methodological 
processes that scientific science theorists, such as Weber and Parsons, laboring 
on level three, have articulated for their own particular sciences. Indeed, The 
Phenomenology of the Social World represents an effort on the part of Schutz, 
on the same level with Weber, as it were, to refine the unclarified basic concepts 
that Weber proffered. In addition, repeatedly Embree lists the basic concepts of 
various sciences, such as psychotherapy, and then suggests that how supple-
mentary basic concepts and ideal-typical methodology derivative from Schutz’s 
phenomenological psychology can assist these cultural sciences in presenting the 
intersubjective meaning interpretation that lies at the basis of all these cultural 
sciences. Even statistical versions of the cultural sciences would presuppose the 
subjective meaning of actors that can be conveyed through Schutzian basic 
concepts and the ideal typical methodology. Finally, not only does Embree (ib.) 
conceive Schutzian phenomenology as cooperating with the scientific science 
theorists of the cultural sciences, but he even adds that higher level reflections 
of methodologists, such as those undertaken by scientific science and philoso-
phical science theorists, need to learn from those engaged in substantive science, 
as Schutz (1996: 146) stated in a letter to Adolf Lowe: 
It is my conviction that methodologists have neither the job nor the authority to 
prescribe to social scientists what they have to do. Humbly, he has to learn from 
social scientists and to interpret for them what they are doing. It seems to me that 
all the great masters of our social sciences proceeded as I have outline in my general 
scheme. 
The emphasis in Embree’s philosophical science theory shows little concern 
about the autonomy of philosophy, as one finds in the Cairns/Husserl framework; 
instead, the focus seems to be much more cooperative, with Embree’s theory 
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respecting the discipline-defining reflections of cultural scientists, supplementing 
their work with basic concepts and methodological processes applicable to all the 
cultural sciences, and even learning from those engaging in substantive science. 
There is, of course, one point at which Embree’s philosophical science theory 
seeks to separate itself from an identification with a particular science that might 
parallel Cairns’s insistence that philosophy distance itself from psychology. That 
point occurs when Embree asserts that Schutz’s philosophical work not be 
identified with phenomenological sociology from which it differs. However, 
Embree’s interest is not in protecting the autonomy of Schutz’s philosophical 
position, but rather in making sure that the resources of Schutz’s foundational 
phenomenological psychology be available to sciences such as psychology and 
psychotherapy, whose principle concentration might be on the interpretive acti-
vity of individuals instead of the social groups that sociology investigates, though 
sociology itself can also draw on the basic concepts and methodological processes 
spelled out in Schutz’s phenomenological psychology. In a sense, Embree sepa-
rates philosophy from (phenomenological) sociology not to protect philosophy’s 
autonomy but to ensure that it be better “marketed” for the broad spectrum of 
cultural sciences beyond sociology. 
Although I have depicted Cairns and Husserl construing the relationship 
between philosophy and psychology as emphasizing the protection of 
philosophy’s autonomy and its distinctness from psychology, it should not be 
overlooked that preserving such autonomy results in benefits for psychology also. 
By separating transcendental phenomenology from psychology one avoids the 
psychologism that Husserl opposed in the Logical Investigations and thereby 
sustains the rules of logic without which psychology and any scientific explanation 
would become meaningless. Furthermore, transcendental phenomenology provi-
des for a sphere in which the material, causal conditions that the sciences study 
will not undermine the conscious processes on which science itself depends. In 
addition, as we have seen, transcendental phenomenology completes the trajec-
tory toward rationality that science itself began insofar as it does not leave 
unattended or forgotten the consciousness of the scientist that science may have 
explained away and insofar as it thereby reverses the crisis of the European 
sciences. Finally, Husserlian transcendental phenomenology defends psychology 
itself against any collapsing of the eidetically defined psychical world into the 
physical reality and against the behaviorism resulted from such a de-diffe-
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rentiation of domains. In this resistance to behaviorism, the Cairns/Husserl 
paradigm converges with the Embree/Schutz (Embree 2015, 21, 37, 55; Schutz 
1962, 53, 58f) perspective that articulates first of all what social reality is, namely 
a world in which actors interpret their world, and that explains how this reality 
therefore requires a distinctive methodology (type-construction) to take account 
of actors’ subjective meaning, as opposed to the world that the natural sciences 
investigate in which molecules and electrons do not interpret their world and the 
(natural) scientists are the only world-interpreters. Behaviorism results when one 
applies the methodology of the natural sciences to the social world, without first 
considering the nature of that social world and the methodology appropriate to 
it. To conclude, because of the historical entanglement of philosophy and 
psychology, Cairns and Husserl emphasize the importance of disentangling them 
and supporting the autonomy of phenomenology/philosophy, and this disenga-
gement eventually redounds to the advantage of both philosophy and psycho-
logy. By contrast, the Embree/Schutz philosophical theory of science lacks any 
such emphasis on philosophical autonomy and seems rather disposed to colla-
borate from the start with the cultural sciences to which it is related, making 
available the basic concepts and correlative methodological procedures needed 
for the intersubjective meaning interpretation that lies at the root of these 
sciences.  
This tension between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological 
psychology as diverse foundational strategies for accommodating psychology 
and/or the cultural sciences is played out in the dialogue between Cairns and 
Embree/Schutz that I have constructed in this essay. The tension had already 
appeared in Edmund Hussserl’s “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen” that Schutz (1967, 
43f) appealed to in order to justify his Phenomenology of the Social World as a 
phenomenological psychology or constitutive phenomenology of the natural atti-
tude. As one might expect, in that essay Husserl (1952, 140), like Cairns, 
opposes from the start the psychologism or transcendental anthropologism that 
occurs when one grounds philosophy on psychology or anthropology and that 
results from not having reach the specific ground of philosophy by entering the 
transcendental sphere through the phenomenological reduction. After stressing 
the intuitional rather than deductive character of transcendental phenomenology, 
he (ib. 144) contrasts descriptive psychology with transcendental phenomeno-
logy, which depends on an attitudinal alteration out of or away from the natural 
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attitude in which on lives among others in the usual sense. But at this point, 
Husserl (ib.) explains how as a psychologist one could remain within the natural 
attitude and describe carefully one’s inner experience, one’s psychic life, through 
account that remain true to what is given in intuition and hence for that reason 
are often called “phenomenological”. Such a “phenomenological psychology” 
must concern itself with the invariant features of a community of psychic life. 
Husserl (ib.) hypothesizes that such a psychology could become a great, self-
standing science (eine grosse eigenstandige Wissenschaft). Although Husserl (ib. 
155f, 159) later criticizes the phenomenological psychologies developed by Franz 
Brentano and John Locke, his early description of phenomenological psychology 
is, in general, quite positive, and it is clear why Schutz would be quite willing to 
claim the title of phenomenological psychology for his own work. However, 
immediately after this brief interlude on phenomenological psychology, Husserl 
(ib. 143, 148, 153, 160, 162) proceeds to heap praise on transcendental 
phenomenology that prescinds from the being-meaning of whatever it analyzes, 
possesses a higher dignity than other sciences and forms of phenomenology, 
exhibits exemplary philosophical responsibility, constitutes an ultimate point of 
view to which the world is relative, must comport itself with autonomy, and 
radically submits every presupposition to examination. Husserl (ib. 148, 160) 
even argues that when one fails to arrive at the transcendental level one’s work 
is “unphilosophical”. While Embree/Schutz would no doubt bristle at the criticism 
that their work is not even philosophical, they were able to find a distinctive place 
in the phenomenological panorama in which they could make positive, 
collaborative contributions to the cultural sciences. 
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